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Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory; 
Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion 
By JAMES C. COX, VERNON L. SMITH, AND JAMES M. WALKER* 
We offer a brief survey of bidding theory 
in high price auctions, of experimental stud- 
ies of behavior in such auctions, and of the 
interplay between the design and results of 
the experiments and efforts to further de- 
velop the theory. Two new series of experi- 
ments are reported. The first applies a con- 
vex transformation of payoffs in an attempt 
to induce a lowering of subject bids "as 
if" the bidders had become less risk averse. 
The second applies a method for inducing 
any prespecified utility function (for risky 
choices) on an individual. We use it to in- 
duce "as if " risk-neutral behavior. Both series 
use baseline control to "calibrate" the hy- 
pothesized effect of the procedures on "risk- 
averse" behavior. 
I. Bidding Theory and its Development 
under Testing 
Early experimental papers testing William 
Vickrey's (1961) noncooperative equilibrium 
model of bidding behavior for risk-neutral 
agents in single unit auctions report the 
robust result that subjects tend to bid signifi- 
cantly higher than the predictions of the 
model when the number of bidders is N ? 4, 
but not when N = 3. (For citations to our 
experimental-theoretical work, see the refer- 
ences in our 1984 article.) The results for 
N ? 4 are consistent with extensions of the 
Vickrey model which postulate that agents 
all have the same concave utility for mone- 
tary surplus (for example, Charles Holt, 
1980). However, these extensions also imply 
that all bidders use the same equilibrium bid 
function: bi(vi) = b(vi) _ bJ(vi), for all i, 
where vi is the value of the auctioned item 
(known only) to i and bn (vi) = (N-1 ) vi /N 
is the Vickrey risk-neutral bid function when 
each vi is drawn independently from the 
constant density on [0, v-]. We have tested the 
null hypothesis that the bids submitted by 
the N bidders in each experimental group 
can be regarded as N samples from the same 
population. It is rejected in 13 of 23 experi- 
mental groups. A straightforward conclusion 
is that an appropriate extension of the model 
should be based on the assumption of het- 
erogeneous risk-averse bidders. We have 
articulated such a model for single unit auc- 
tions and extended it to multiple unit dis- 
criminative auctions. Experimental tests of 
the multiple unit model strongly support the 
interpretation that bidders bid as if they 
were heterogeneous and risk averse (we reject 
the hypothesis of homogeneous agents in 24 
of 28 experimental groups). 
This constant relative risk-averse (CRRA) 
model assumes that (a) each agent i chooses 
bi to maximize EU(bi) = (vi -bi)'Gi(bi) 
where Gi(bi) is the probability that bi is the 
highest of N bids; (b) agent expectations are 
rational, Gi(bi) = G(bi); (c) each vi in any 
auction is drawn independently from the 
constant density on [0, v-]; (d) the N agents 
are drawn from a population with some dis- 
tribution 4(ri) on the characteristic ri E (0,1]. 
For single unit auctions, these assumptions 
imply the inverse equilibrium bid function 
(1) vi = (N-I+ rJ)bi/(N-1), 
forall biE [O,b], 
where b = (N -1 ) v-/N is the maximum bid 
that would be made by a risk-neutral agent. 
(The solution for b > b has no closed form.) 
Hence, if any two of N bidders (i, J) have 
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distinct CRRA parameters (ri, rj), a predic- 
tion of the model is that in a sequence of 
auctions t = 1, 2,..., T, the observed bids will 
identify a distinct homogeneous linear bid 
function for each bidder whose slope will 
reveal each bidder's CRRA utility parameter. 
We have conducted and reported two di- 
rect tests of the above CRRA model and its 
multiple unit generalization. The first test 
applies the following property of CRRA util- 
ity: a scalar change, a, in payoffs has no 
effect on expected CRRA utility-maximizing 
decisions. This is seen in (a) above if we 
express expected utility in the form, EU(bi) 
= [a(vi - bi)]riG(bi), where a(vi - bi) is the 
outcome in U.S. currency for the winning 
bidder. Since a affects only the scale of 
utility it has no effect on the bid function (1). 
We report paired comparison experiments in 
which a = $1 in the control experiments and 
a = $3 in the paired treatment experiments. 
There is no significant difference in the out- 
comes between paired experiments. Simi- 
larly, if v- is increased, say tripled, this mod- 
el predicts the same scalar increase in vi, b, 
and vi - bi; that is, in (a) we can write ex- 
pected utility in the form EU(pi) = [i-(vF - 
,L)]rG(,i), where [i = b/v, vi = v. 
Hence a scalar change in the vi has no effect 
on normalized bids. We have reported com- 
parison experiments (multiple units) in which 
v- (and each vi) is tripled. The effect is to 
triple average bids, and the conclusions based 
on a = $1 are not altered when a = $3. 
Since CRRA utility is the only utility func- 
tion with these scalar invariance properties, 
these experiments provide important in- 
dependent support for the theory beyond the 
earlier ex post analysis showing that ob- 
served bids are consistent with the assump- 
tion that agents are risk averse and heteroge- 
neous. The new tests for scalar effects were 
motivated a priori by the theory. 
Two well-known "logical" objections to 
all CRRA utility models are a recurring part 
of the conventional wisdom connected with 
expected utility theory (EUT), although 
these objections are devoid of observational 
support: (A) "CRRA utility is unacceptable 
as it implies that absolute risk aversion grows 
without bound as v - b approaches zero"; 
(B) "The CRRA bidding model admits of a 
tractable solution only if initial wealth is (or 
can be normalized on) zero." 
The a priorist objection (A) asserts that 
any EUT model can be "tested" by examin- 
ing its absolute risk-averse implications, and 
that behavior near some boundary (zero) is a 
crucial test of any hypothesis. This is like 
arguing (without resorting to observation) 
that the inverse square law of attraction is 
falsified, since the force of attraction goes to 
infinity as the distance between masses ap- 
proaches zero! For the vast majority of sub- 
jects, when v is near zero, the ratio of bid to 
value is similar to that for large values of v; 
that is, one observes no peculiarity in bid- 
ding behavior near zero, which is predicted 
by equation (1) based on CRRA utility. A 
small minority of subjects bid either zero or 
their value, at low values of v. This "throw 
away" bid phenomenon can be interpreted 
as the result of payoffs being so low that it is 
not worth the trouble of a "serious" bid. 
Since it is not clear what is "optimal" when 
payoffs are at epsilon levels, other theories 
such as random or erratic behavior should 
not be discounted, just as in particle theory 
(which is disciplined by data) other theories 
take over in the small. 
Concerning objection (B), we have been 
quite explicit from the beginning in referring 
to vi -bi as the monetary income from an 
auction. This is because we accept the find- 
ings of a vast literature going back at least to 
Markowitz, and corroborated by Mosteller 
and Nogee, Davidson, Suppes and Siegel, 
Edwards, Kahneman and Tversky, Binswan- 
ger, and others (see Mark Machina, 1982, for 
numerous references). Generally this litera- 
ture supports the relative invariance of risk- 
taking decision behavior with initial wealth 
(the "Markowitz hypothesis" of a horizon- 
tally shifting utility of wealth). Also, this 
literature does not find support for constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) (Machina, p. 
285). The prize to which EUT applies (wealth, 
income etc.) is a hypothesis separate from the 
axioms of EUT which do not define that prize. 
Various extensions of the original Vickrey 
model and of Holt's identical bidders risk- 
averse model are contained in the literature. 
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Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber (1982) con- 
sider the effect of information. However, 
given the robust experimental result that bid- 
ders bid as if they are heterogeneous and risk 
averse, these extensions (for first price and 
Dutch auctions) are based on behavioral as- 
sumptions already shown to be inconsistent 
with the data. Eric Maskin and John Riley 
(1984) offer a potentially fruitful extension 
based on the assumption of a one-parameter 
utility function u(-bi,Oi), where bi is i's 
bid. If 9i= vi, we have the case of identical 
bidders with differing private values, but with 
the bidding commodity medium distinct from 
the commodity item being auctioned. If 9i = ri 
(any risk parameter), we have heterogeneous 
risk-averse bidders, but, implicitly, all must 
place the same value on the auctioned item. 
Thus the minimum generalization requires a 
utility function of the form u(vi - bi; ri) to 
capture both taste and risk attitude diversity. 
Cox and Smith (1984) develop an equi- 
librium bidding model for a utility function 
of the form u(9- b,9 -1), where (,, &0) is 
an M vector of characteristics. 
II. Models of Control for the Effect 
of Risk Aversion 
We interpret the observation that subjects 
bid in excess of the predictions of the Vickrey 
model as due to heterogeneous risk-averse 
agents, and have used this interpretation to 
develop an improved model. Subsequently 
this model was found to be consistent with 
the scalar invariance tests described above. 
Now we ask whether direct methods might 
be applied to examine this risk-averse in- 
terpretation of the data. Other interpreta- 
tions are possible. We might assume in place 
of (a) that agents choose bids to maximize 
EU(bi) = (vi - bi)Gi(bi), and instead of (b), 
that Gi(bi) = [G(bi)]l/ri, where I/ri is now 
a characteristic of bidder i that transforms 
the objective probability of winning, G(bi), 
into a subjective probability of winning, 
[G(bi )] l/ri. This subjective expected value 
(SEV) model is prominent in psychology 
(see Machina, pp. 290-91). It abandons 
Muthian rational expectations, but the re- 
sulting model yields a bid function identical 
with (1), and the two theories are observa- 
tionally equivalent on the basis of all experi- 
mental tests to date. The methodological 
point is that the parameter ri is not observ- 
able; it is a construct based on an interpreta- 
tion of what is driving behavior, and other 
interpretations are potentially admissible. We 
have adopted the heterogeneous risk-averse 
interpretation because it is an integral part of 
the traditional EUT, while the alternative is 
thought to be "ad hoc." This does not mean 
that EUT is "true," but that it appears that 
there is not yet a sufficient basis for the 
scientific community to abandon EUT. 
We propose two payoff manipulation 
models which, based on EUT, should have a 
determinate effect as interpreted in terms of 
risk aversion. If these models are "correct," 
and our interpretation that subjects are risk 
averse is correct, the new data should be 
consistent with these predictions. 
Model I. In a first price auction, if sub- 
ject i wins, suppose that instead of paying 
(vi - bi) dollars to i we pay a(vi-b1)2 dol- 
lars, a > 0. In the CRRA model it is seen 
that the problem now is to maximize EU(bi) 
= [a(vi - bi)2]riG(bi) and equation (1) be- 
comes vi =(N-1 + 2ri)bi/(N-1), for all bi 
E[O,b], where b=(N-l1)v/(N+1). Thus 
if an individual's personal measure of CRRA 
is 1- ri, under the payoff transformation of 
Model I, that individual will behave "as if" 
the CRRA measure had changed to 1-2ri. 
This equation provides strong quantitative 
predictions of the effect of the transforma- 
tion. A weaker qualitative prediction is that 
the individual will bid less under the trans- 
formation. 
Model II. Instead of paying (vi-bi) 
dollars to the high bidder, suppose we pay 
the winner (vi - bi) unit lottery tickets. The 
individual then participates in a lottery in 
which he/she receives xl dollars in U.S. 
currency with probability (vi - bi)/v and x2 
dollars (xi> x2) with probability 1- (vi - 
bi)/v. Suppose further that the N-1 low 
bidders in the auction all receive x2 dollars. 
Since the probability of xl is linearly increas- 
ing in (vi - bi), if EUT applies to individual 
behavior this procedure will cause the indi- 
vidual to bid "as if" risk neutral (Alvin Roth 
and Michael Malouf, 1979; Joyce Berg et al., 
1984). To see this, note that bidder i's deci- 
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sion problem is to 
(2) max [Gi(bi)(ui(xD(Vib) 
+ ui(X2)l Vi- )) + (1- Gi (bi))Ui(X2)4 
- Ui(Xl)-Ui(X2)] 
x max [vi -bi) Gi.(bi) ]+ Ui(XA) 
bi 
which is formally equivalent to Vickrey, giv- 
ing vi = Nbi/(N -1), if Gi(b,) = G(bi). 
Berg et al. have generalized this procedure 
to induce any prespecified preferences, which 
they proceed to test experimentally using 
CARA and constant absolute risk-preferring 
(CARP) preferences. They provide a qualita- 
tive test by soliciting responses to a choice 
between two bets, A and B, with the prop- 
erty that the induced CARA function implies 
that A is preferred to B while the CARP 
function predicts that B is preferred to A. 
They report that significantly more than half 
(88.3 percent) of the choices correspond to 
the predictions. They also elicit minimum 
selling prices for bets from the two groups 
and compare these with the calculated cer- 
tainty equivalents of the bets. The observed 
prices reported by the subjects are then com- 
pared with those predicted to provide a 
quantitative test of their model. For both 
groups they reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between the average observed 
prices and those predicted. However, the 
average prices from the risk-averse group 
tended to be systematically biased above the 
predicted certainty equivalent. Also, the vari- 
ance of the observed prices was high. 
This is encouraging in that it provides 
evidence favoring the gross predictive impli- 
cations of inducing known preferences on 
subjects. The procedure is potentially im- 
portant in enabling one to (a) control for risk 
aversion where other aspects of behavior are 
the primary focus of the investigation (Roth 
and Malouf), or (b) induce known risk pref- 
erences in a market whose behavior is hy- 
pothesized to be driven by risk aversion. 
To our knowledge this promising proce- 
dure has not been test-calibrated in a market 
context; that is, used to induce particular 
preferences in a market which yields predic- 
tions interpretable in preference terms. High 
price auctions allow one to do this based on 
the Vickrey risk-neutral special case. 
III. Experiments and Results: Model I, 
Quadratic Transformation 
Twelve subjects participated in three ses- 
sions each consisting of 4 bidders. Each ses- 
sion consisted of a baseline sequence (EiB) 
of 20 auctions (12 in session 1) in which each 
subject was paid one cent for each PLATO 
experimental cent earned, 
(3) ( cash cen ts ) = ( PLA TO cents), 
followed by a transformation sequence 
(El T) of 20 auctions in which for each 
auction cash earnings were calculated using 
(4) (cash cents) = 0.02 (PLATO cents )2. 
In the PLA TO instructions for El T, tables 
and graphs are used to inform the subjects of 
the payoff implications of this transforma- 
tion. After the first three sessions were com- 
pleted, four of the subjects were recruited for 
a fourth retest session consisting of 20 trans- 
formation auctions. 
Our initial approach to comparing bidding 
behavior in El T and EiB was twofold. First, 
we ask whether the mean normalized bid of a 
subject differs in a transformation experi- 
ment from that in a baseline experiment. 
Since the value realizations from the uniform 
distribution will differ in the two experi- 
ments, if i bids b* when the realized value is 
v*, we normalize the bid by subtracting the 
risk-neutral Vickrey bid, bn(v*). Thus, for 
each i we compute the difference D1= bi*- 
bn( Vi*) for each auction, giving a set of dif- 
ferences {Di'} in ElB and a set {DfT} in 
Bi El T. The means Di were positive for all 
subjects, indicating that all were risk averse 
in the baseline sequence. Also, Dif> 0 for all 
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i, as each subject continues to exhibit risk 
aversion under the transformation. Further- 
more, D)5'B - DT is positive for eight of the 
twelve subjects indicating, as predicted, a 
shift toward less risk-averse behavior with 
the transformation. In the retest, session 4, 
all four subjects bid lower in El T than in 
EIB (one subject had bid higher in the earlier 
session). 
However, this apparently good support for 
Model I could not withstand deeper ex- 
amination. The payoffs in (3) and (4) imply 
that a bid for a profit of less than 50 yields a 
lower return under the transformation than 
in the baseline, and vice versa for a bid with 
potential profit in excess of 50. Aware of 
this, in advance of the experiments we had 
conjectured that a "satisficer" might bid rel- 
atively lower (higher) in El T at profit levels 
below (above) 50, as a means of maintaining 
E B performance in E T. A closer examina- 
tion of individual bids revealed that this 
effect was strong, contrary to the predictions 
of Model I. 
IV. Experiments and Results: 
Model II, Lottery Payoffs 
Twelve new subjects participated in three 
sessions, each consisting of 4 bidders and 
two parts. The first part was a sequence of 20 
baseline experiments (E2B) with each sub- 
ject paid one cent in cash for each cent 
earned in the experiment. The second part 
consisted of a sequence of 20 auctions (E2L) 
in which subjects in effect earned one lottery 
ticket for each cent won in an auction. Eight 
of the twelve subjects were then recruited for 
two retest sessions, 4 and 5, consisting of 20 
auctions with the lottery payoff. The lottery 
operated as follows: A box containing 1000 
tickets, numbered consecutively, was dis- 
played to the subjects. The high bidder in 
each auction was assigned ticket numbers in 
an amount equal to the bidders experimental 
profit in cents. Thus, if the winning bidder 
had a value of $8 and bid $6 when v = $10, 
she might be assigned the lottery numbers 
1-200. If the ticket she then drew was in the 
range 1-200, she received a cash payoff of 
$7.50. Otherwise, she received $0.25. All los- 
ing bidders received $0.25 in cash. 
Ten of the twelve subjects bid significantly 
".as if" risk averse in E2B, but, contrary to 
Model II, only one of these subjects was 
induced to bid as if risk neutral in E2L. It 
appears that Model II has one chance in ten 
of making a correct strong form prediction. 
This result was not changed for any subject 
in the retest sessions 4 and 5. A weak form 
prediction of Model II is that the difference 
between baseline and lottery mean bids, D1B 
-5L, is positive indicating a shift toward 
risk neutrality. Only six of twelve subjects 
were consistent with this prediction. 
V. Conclusions of the 
Calibration Experiments 
Model I, applying a quadratic payoff 
transformation, predicts a doubling of the 
"as if" CRRA parameter ri, or, more weakly, 
a shift in the direction of lower bids (less 
risk-averse bidding). The experimental re- 
sults belie this prediction. A close examina- 
tion of individual bidding suggests that sub- 
jects bid less only when the profit potential is 
below the 50 cent "break-even" level. Above 
this 50 cent potential profit level, subjects 
tend to bid relatively higher. This can be 
interpreted as a type of "satisficing" behav- 
ior in which subjects attempt to do at least as 
well under the quadratic transformation as 
in the baseline experiments. Does this test 
invalidate the CRRA model of bidding? No; 
literally, it questions the conjunction of the 
CRRA model with the transformation of 
Model I. Since the CRRA model has per- 
formed well in previous tests, Model I should 
be the immediate focus of deeper examina- 
tion. In particular, the results suggest the 
need for a change in design that would 
eliminate the break-even 50 cent profit de- 
fined by the intersection of the baseline and 
quadratic payoff functions. The predicted re- 
sult is that the hypothesized satisficing effect 
will be eliminated. Of course, the theory 
asserts that behavior should not be affected 
by this artifact, but one would like to know 
if the theory does better when the artifact is 
removed. After all, these are not calculating 
agents, and it may not be difficult to intro- 
duce perceptual distortions that alter equi- 
librium behavior. 
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Model II predicts risk-neutral bidding for 
any subject showing risk-averse bidding in a 
baseline experiment. Since nine of ten sub- 
jects bid significantly above the risk-neutral 
bid function under both lottery and mone- 
tary payoffs, these results do not support the 
predictions of Model II. Given the generally 
supportive results of earlier direct tests of the 
bidding model, the predictive failure of 
Model II can be interpreted as providing 
(indirect) evidence against the compound lot- 
tery axiom of EUT that is essential in Model 
II. Furthermore, these results may have im- 
plications for other research programs that 
must postulate the behavioral validity of the 
lottery procedure as a conditional in experi- 
mental tests of models that require risk atti- 
tude of agents to be controlled. 
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